Working Papers

Segment and Rule: Modern Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes (with Kun Heo)

Job Market Paper draft (under review).

Abstract. We analyze the incentives of authoritarian regimes to segment access to censored content through technology. Citizens choose whether to pay to access censored online content at a cost fixed by the regime: the firewall. A low firewall segments access and generates more compliance than full censorship – a high firewall – ever could. Regime opponents self-select into consuming censored content, and comply conditional on positive independent reporting. Regime supporters exclusively consume state propaganda, which secures their compliance. This segment-and-rule strategy can be engineered by making local news outlets uninformative, in- vesting in domestic entertainment or strategically banning foreign entertainment.

Censorship in Large Societies (with Kun Heo)

Draft available here. Under review

Abstract.  An authoritarian regime faces a heterogeneous citizenry that consumes information from a regime- controlled and an opposition outlet that is known to be, if anything, biased against the regime. We characterize the optimal reporting strategy for the regime-controlled outlet and the existence of censorship incentives for the regime, assuming that censorship is cost-less. Fixing a median citizen, whether censorship is optimal depends on where the mass of citizens lie on either side of the median citizen. In polarized societies, a non-monotonic relationship emerges between censorship incentives and the opposition outlet’s reporting slant against the regime.





From Elite to Mass: Repression and Purges in Authoritarian Regimes (with Stephane Wolton)

Slides available here. Draft coming soon.

Abstract. This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to study the interaction of mass and elite purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that the decision to purge the elite and the breadth of a mass purge of agents are closely intertwined and crucially depend on how closely connected are new hires to the elite in place. If this connection is low so that the autocrat has good control of the hiring process, good performance is not always sufficient to save the elite. As the autocrat starts purging the elite, she carries out a smaller mass purge. Mass purges are, therefore, mostly used to dissuade a disloyal incumbent elite. In contrast, if the connection between agent and the elite is high, so that the latter controls the hiring process, the elite can survive poor performance. As the autocrat starts purging the elite, the breadth of the mass purge increases. Mass purges become a tool to dissuade a disloyal replacement elite.


The Case for Lobbying Transparency

Draft available here (under review).


In response to voters’ demands to reduce interest groups’ influence over policy-making, many countries are passing or discussing transparency regulations on the activities of lobbyists. What is the impact of these laws? To study this question, I combine a lobbying model with a canonical model of political agency. I show that the need for lobbying transparency is rooted in the conflicting policy and electoral incentives of politicians rather than in the risk of undue influence by interest groups per se. Then, by making clearer the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency both helps voters control the influence of interest groups and better punish politicians who do not represent their best interests. I also show that politicians often have little incentives to implement lobbying transparency, potentially explaining why voters’ demand for it remains unanswered.

Work In Progress

Dynamics of Violence in Authoritarian Regimes (with Anna Denisenko and Kun Heo)